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Abstract   
 
We investigate the determinants of commercial bank acquisitions in the former fifteen 
countries of the European Union by evaluating the impact of bank-specific measures, 
such as size, growth and efficiency of banks, and external influences reflecting industry 
level differences in the regulatory and supervision framework, market environment and 
economic conditions. Our empirical analysis involves multinomial logit estimation at 
various levels in order to identify those characteristics that most consistently predict 
targets and acquirers from a sample of over 1400 commercial banks. The overall results 
indicate that, relative to banks that were not involved in the acquisitions, (i) targets and 
acquirers were significantly larger, less well capitalized and less cost efficient, (ii) targets 
were less profitable with lower growth prospects, and acquirers more profitable with 
higher growth prospects, (iii) external factors have affected targets and acquirers 
differently, and their effects have not been consistent or robust to sample size changes.    
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 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The EU banking industry has witnessed a large number of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) in recent years. The European Central Bank (2000), for example, records 2,153 
M&As of credit institutions between 1995 and the first half of 2000, while Beitel and 
Schiereck (2001) point out that during the period 1998-2000 more M&As deals occurred 
in the EU banking industry than during the previous 14 years. In terms of volume, data 
from the Securities Data Company (SDC) M&A Database
1
 indicate that the total value of 
European financial M&As increased from $22,769.6 million in 1990 to $147,025.6 in 
1999, while over the same period, the average target value in Europe ($467.7 millions) 
was higher than in the US ($334 millions) and the main industrial countries on an 
aggregate basis ($383.2 millions).  
Theory suggests that M&As between banks can occur for several reasons. In 
general, the underlying motives can be classified as value-maximization (i.e. increase 
market power, replace inefficient management, achieve economies of scale and scope, 
decrease risk through geographic and product diversification) and non-value 
maximization ones (i.e. managerial motives, hubris, etc.). In addition to these firm level 
motives, banks’ decision for M&As might be influenced by external factors such as 
industry level differences in the economic environment, laws, regulations, etc  (Berger et 
al., 1999; Group of Ten, 2001).   
While there are numerous empirical studies investigating the relationship between 
financial characteristics and acquisition likelihood of industrial (i.e. non-financial) firms 
(e.g. Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981; Harris et al., 1982; Hasbrouck, 1985; Ambrose and 
                                                 
1
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Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997; Gonzalez et al., 1997; Ali-Yrkko et al., 2005), 
investigation of such characteristics for the banking industry has been limited (Cyree et 
al., 2000; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). Furthermore, previous studies on bank 
acquisitions have traditionally focused on examining the financial characteristics of US 
banks (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987; Meric et al., 1991; Moore, 1996; Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2000, 2004; Hannan and Pilloff, 2009), while there have been relatively few 
studies for the EU countries. Hernando et al (2009) and Kohler (2009) are the most recent 
focussing on domestic and cross-border bank acquisitions in the EU-25 countries, while 
Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) examine the characteristics of cross-border 
acquisitions of Central and Eastern European banks by Western European banks.
2
  In 
addition, a limited number of studies have focussed on specific countries of the EU (e.g. 
Focarelli et al, 2002; Pasiouras and Zopounidis, 2008; Pasiouras and Gaganis, 2009).   
Evidence on the impact of external factors on M&As decisions also comes mostly 
from studies that examine industrial sectors, with the neoclassical and behavioural 
approaches being the most commonly cited explanations. From the previously mentioned 
studies in the banking sector, some have examined the impact of the economic 
environment using industry level characteristics such as market concentration, growth, 
profitability or size. However, the neoclassical theory, proposed by Gort (1969) and more 
recently supported by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) among others, assumes that legal 
and regulatory factors might also have a role to play in the reallocation of corporate 
assets through M&A activity. Thus, for example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) examine the 
                                                 
2
 These three studies for the EU, as well as Hannan and Pilloff (2009) for the US, came to our light since 
we wrote the initial version of this paper.  Hernando et al (2009) actually refer to evidence reported in this 
paper but, as they acknowledge, our paper differs from theirs by providing evidence for the EU-15 with a 
focus on the role of differences in regulations.   
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influence of differences in law and regulation in their study of the determinants of M&As 
across 49 major countries, and find that the volume of M&A activity is significantly 
larger in countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder protection.  
In the bank M&As literature, the study of the impact of regulations and 
supervision approaches has also been investigated as forces hindering cross-border deals. 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001), using data on 2,449 banks from 29 OECD countries, point 
out that cross-border M&As among banks are less frequent than in other sectors of the 
economy, and find that the difference depends partly on the level of regulatory 
restrictions. In another study, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) examine where banks expand 
their cross-border shareholdings and find that potential profit opportunities and regulatory 
environments are the most important determinants. Buch and DeLong (2004a) provide 
further evidence on why cross-border mergers are rare compared to domestic mergers 
using a large sample of over 3000 international bank M&As. Treating the number of 
cross-border bank mergers for each country pair as the dependent variable in Tobit 
regressions, they find that information costs and regulations significantly influence cross-
border merger activity. In their later study of cross-border bank mergers for the OECD 
countries, Buch and DeLong (2004b) reveal that a fairly priced deposit insurance scheme 
in the acquirer’s country tends not only to increase the number of cross-border deals but 
also reduce the risk in both the home and world markets.  More recently, Kohler (2009) 
examines the impact of merger control as a potential deterrent to EU bank acquisitions 
and finds that the transparency of the merger approval process serves to influence the 
likelihood of cross-border acquisitions, although domestic deals are unaffected by this.  
 5 
Studies for the US banking industry are by their very nature limited to domestic 
M&As, although Wheelock and Wilson (2004) examine the impact of state branching 
laws and regulator evaluations of banks safety and soundness, focusing principally on 
acquirers. Their results also indicate that the regulatory approval process serves as a real 
constraint on bank merger activity, although changes in branching restriction are not 
statistically significant. 
This paper adds to the recent literature by investigating the acquisition likelihood 
characteristics for the EU banking industry.  As noted above, relative to the US, the 
literature investigating the characteristics of bank acquisition likelihood in the EU has 
been limited, and we attempt to provide further evidence by concentrating on the period 
1997-2002, when M&A activity in the EU banking industry was intense.
3
 Our dataset 
consists of industry level data on the first 15 EU countries (EU15), and financial data for 
over 1,400 commercial banks operating in EU15, these being distinguished as acquirers, 
targets and non-involved banks.  This unique dataset therefore enables us to analyze the 
ex-ante characteristics of both acquired and acquiring banks relative to non-acquired 
peers.
4
 In doing so, we concentrate on evaluating the relative influence of bank level 
characteristics and industry level differences in the banks’ operating environment and 
economic conditions, as well as in their regulatory and supervision frameworks.   
                                                 
3
 We concentrate on this period because it witnessed a reduction of nearly 23% in the number of banks in 
the EU and this decrease was due largely to domestic bank M&As as banking groups consolidated their 
position within countries to create national champions (ECB, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2006). Hence, 
our sample includes mainly domestic deals, as cross-border integration in banking remained limited until 
recently (ECB, 2008).  See Hernando et al (2009), Lanine and Vander Vennett (2007) and Kohler (2008) 
for recent evidence relating to cross-border bank M&As within the EU. 
4
 In this sense, we analyse both the pull and push factors affecting the probability of acquisition.  Note that 
the terms acquirer (or bidder), target and non-involved could alternatively be interpreted as acquiring, 
acquired and non-acquired banks respectively, and will be used interchangeably in this paper.  
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The distinguishing aspect of our study is the examination of a broad range of 
policy influences that proxy for bank regulations and supervision standards, such as the 
level of accounting and information disclosure requirements, the degree of official 
disciplinary power, deposit insurance schemes, capital adequacy requirements, 
restrictions on bank activities and diversification guidelines.  We obtain this information 
from the World Bank database, developed by Barth et al. (2001), and presume that these 
policy variables have either a direct impact on M&As or an indirect impact, for example, 
by limiting the investment opportunities of banks or influencing their risk-taking 
behaviour.
5
   
As noted above, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001, 2005) and Buch and De Long 
(2004a,b) consider the impact of the regulatory environment on cross border deals.  In 
contrast, we consider the impact of country-specific differences in the regulatory 
environment on commercial bank M&As in the EU single market, where such deals have 
been largely domestic. Although this makes our study somewhat related to the studies of 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Wheelock and Wilson (2004), it should be noted that the 
former uses, in the main, the volume of merger activity as a dependent variable
6
 and does 
not focus on the banking industry, while the latter concentrates on investigating 
characteristics of US bank acquirers that originate from the CAMEL approach with a 
limited set of further attributes to represent market environment and regulations.    
                                                 
5
 Many studies argue that regulations such as capital requirements, deposit insurance scheme, restrictions 
on bank activities, disciplinary power of the authorities can have an impact on the risk taking behavior of 
banks (e.g. Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Hovakimian et al, 2003; 
Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005; Gonzalez, 2005; Pennacchi, 2006). Amihud et al. (2002) and Buch and 
DeLong (2004b) point out that one way to take advantage of such regulations is to acquire a risky bank.  
6
 With the exception of recent studies (e.g. Lanine and Vander Vennett 2007; Hernando et al, 2009; 
Koehler, 2008), most previous studies that examined cross-border mergers focussed on the number of 
mergers (i.e. activity) rather than on the probability of individual banks to engage in M&As.  
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 Using multinomial logit estimation to determine the impact of the above factors 
on the probability of acquisition, we show, with a fair degree of consistency across 
various levels of estimation, that both targets and acquirers were significantly larger, less 
well capitalized and less efficient in terms of expenses management, relative to their non-
acquired peers. Furthermore, targets were less profitable with lower liquidity and lower 
growth in total assets; whereas acquirers tended to be relatively more profitable banks 
with higher growth prospects. These bank-specific influences are invariant to robustness 
tests conducted by disaggregating the sample according to bank size, location of 
operation and different time periods. But the impact of the regulatory and market 
environments are not robust to these sample splits and therefore depends crucially on 
whether the banks involved in acquisitions were large or small, and specifically where 
they operated. Besides, some regulatory influences were not uniform on targets and 
acquirers. Nevertheless, we find supporting evidence to suggest that banks that operated 
in countries with higher disciplining power of the authorities were less likely to engage in 
acquisitions, as targets or acquirers. Similarly, banks were more inclined to engage in 
acquisitions in market environments favouring higher profitability, higher liquidity, lower 
concentration and lower industry size, although these influences were not robustly 
significant.  Furthermore, regulatory factors were found to have a greater influence on 
banks acquisitions in the principal banking sectors (i.e. the five largest countries of the 
EU) than in the rest of the EU-15 where market influences were more prevalent.     
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a review of prior 
literature related to our study. Section III outlines the data and methodology, while 
 8 
Section IV discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section V outlines some concluding 
remarks.  
 
II. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section we provide a comprehensive review of the relevant literature in order to 
justify the importance of using appropriate controls for bank regulation and supervision 
standards, and market-related economic conditions associated with M&As decisions in 
the banking industry, in addition to relevant bank specific characteristics. The discussion 
is split into three sub-sections, referring to each of the three broad categories in turn.    
 
Bank M&As and bank specific characteristics 
The causes of M&As have long been debated in the literature. Following the neoclassical 
perspective, all firm decisions including acquisitions are made with the objective of 
maximizing shareholders wealth. M&As in this context serve as a means to increase 
market power, replace inefficient management, achieve economies of scale and scope, 
decrease risk through geographic and product diversification, among others. However, an 
influential view in the literature is that M&As are driven by agency conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders. According to this view, many acquisitions are 
undertaken by managers in order to enhance their salary and prestige, diversify personal 
risk or secure their job through empire-building, at the expense of shareholders. Another 
interesting hypothesis, proposed by Roll (1986), suggests that managers commit errors of 
over-optimism (hubris) in evaluating M&As opportunities due to excessive prediction or 
 9 
faith on their own abilities, and engage in M&As even when there is no synergy. The 
empirical evidence is inconclusive and indicates that various bank specific and market 
environmental factors can influence M&As in the banking industry. Hence, while the 
discussion below is devoted to financial and environmental characteristics, non-financial 
attributes relating to managerial incentives and ownership control may be important too 
(Hadlock et al., 1999; Brook et al., 2000; Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Hughes et al., 2003).
7
   
 
Capital Strength  
Harper (2000) argues that “The key factor driving mergers and acquisitions in financial 
systems is the industry’s need to rationalize its use of capital” (p. 68). This argument is 
based on the belief that nowadays risks are traded on markets rather than absorbed 
through capital held on a balance sheet. Hence, in order to remain competitive banks face 
the need either to release surplus capital or to raise the rate of return to the capital they 
retain. This can be achieved through M&As.  
Most of the studies report a negative relationship between capital ratios and the 
likelihood of being acquired although not statistically significant in all cases (e.g. Hannan 
and Rhoades, 1987; Moore, 1996; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Lanine and Vander 
Vennet, 2007). There are several explanations for this. First, lack of financial strength 
tends to attract well capitalised buyers that can infuse capital into the acquired banks. 
Specifically, banks that are generally close to failure are encouraged by the authorities to 
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 Lack of appropriate data precludes investigation of these issues given our comprehensive sample of 
public and private banks.   However, agency cost influences have been linked to industries where hostile or 
diversifying acquisitions are more prevalent, as diversification benefits managers due to the diversification 
discount (Morck et al, 1990), but these types of acquisitions are rare in banking owing to regulatory 
hurdles.      
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be taken over by well capitalized banks.  Second, better capitalised banks would be less 
attractive to potential buyers if capitalization is seen to indicate managerial efficiency.  
Third, buyers are attracted by less well capitalised banks with skilful managers who show 
ability to operate successfully with high leverage. Related to the third argument, Hannan 
and Piloff (2009) suggest that buyers prefer poor capitalized targets because it enables 
them to maximize the magnitude of post-merger performance gains relative to the cost of 
achieving these gains. 
Banks may also engage in M&As to meet higher capital regulatory requirements, 
suggesting a positive link between capitalization and acquisition likelihood. Valkanov 
and Kleimeir (2007) examine a sample of US and European bank mergers and find that 
US targets are better capitalized than acquirers and non-acquired peers and that US banks 
maintain higher capital levels than European banks. They suggest that US banks 
strategically raised their capital levels through mergers to avoid regulatory scrutiny.    
Alternatively, as suggested by Hernando et al. (2009), if capitalization signifies the 
inability of a bank to diversify assets, more capitalized banks would be worth more to 
better diversified acquirers, thus enhancing the likelihood of being acquired.  Hernando et 
al. (2009) discuss these hypotheses about positive and negative links between acquisition 
and capitalization but find the effect of the latter insignificant in both domestic and cross-
border samples. 
  
Performance  
According to the inefficient management hypothesis, acquisitions serve to drive out bad 
management that is not working in shareholder interests. Thus, as discussed by Hannan 
and Rhoades (1987), poorly managed banks are likely targets for acquirers who think that 
 11 
they can manage more efficiently the assets of the acquired bank and increase profits and 
value.  This outcome is more likely in domestic (or in-market) than in cross-border (out-
of market) M&As, because a local acquirer may be in a better position to turn around the 
fortunes of the target bank (Hernando et al, 2009).  
However, the empirical results are mixed. Moore (1996), Focarelli et al. (2002), 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Pasiouras and Gaganis (2009), Hannan and Pilloff (2009) 
and Hernando et al (2009) find evidence of a negative association between target 
performance (measured in terms of either return on assets (profitability), expense ratios 
such as cost-to income, or both) and acquisition likelihood.  In contrast, Hannan and 
Rhoades (1987), Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) and Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) 
find no evidence of such association, whereas Kohler (2009) finds the effect of targets’ 
return on assets significant in cross-border deals only, indicating that profitability does 
not seem to influence the probability of being acquired in domestic M&As.
8
 
 
Size 
Size may influence M&As in several ways. First, large banks are more expensive to be 
acquired. Second, larger banks have greater recourse to fight hostile acquisitions, as well 
as resources to acquire other banks. Third, a larger acquired bank is likely to be more 
difficult to be absorbed in the existing organization of the acquiring bank.  These 
considerations suggest that the coefficient of size (as measured by total assets) on 
acquisitions should be negative.  On the other hand, an acquirer seeking economies of 
scale or market power may find larger bank targets more attractive. 
                                                 
8
 However, using the cost-to-income ratio instead of the return on assets, Kohler (2008) claims to find the 
effect significant in both domestic and cross-border cases. 
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Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Moore (1996) find the effect of size 
insignificant. Wheelock and Wilson (2000), however, report that smaller banks are more 
likely to be acquired than larger ones, while Wheelock and Wilson (2004) find that the 
acquirers’ probability of engaging in mergers increases with bank size. Focarelli et al. 
(2002) report a negative and statistically significant effect of size on acquisitions for 
Italy, while Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) find a negative, though not robustly 
significant, effect for Greece (depending on the measure of size).  In contrast, Hannan 
and Pilloff (2009) report a positive impact of size in their full sample, but a negative 
effect on a sub-sample focusing on smaller acquirers.  Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007) 
and Kohler (2009) report a positive and significant impact of size in all their samples, 
although Hernando et al (2009) find a similar result only for domestic deals. 
 
Growth 
Bank growth can affect bank acquisition in two opposing ways. On the one hand, as 
Kocagil et al. (2002) point out, empirical evidence suggests that some banks with 
relatively high growth rates experience problems because their management and/or 
structure is not able to deal with and sustain exceptional growth. Hence, acquirers may 
purchase a bank with good growth prospects, but with limited financial or managerial 
capacity may fail to capitalize on potential growth. On the other hand, Moore (1996) 
argues that a slow growing bank may attract a buyer seeking to accelerate its growth rate 
and thereby increase its market value.  
Hannan and Rhoades (1987) find growth to be positively related to in-market 
acquisitions and negatively related to out-of-market acquisitions, albeit insignificant in 
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both cases. However, Moore (1996) and Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) find asset 
growth to be negatively related to acquisition likelihood. Pasiouras and Gaganis (2009) 
also find growth to be negatively related to the acquisition likelihood but statistically 
significant only in the case of Germany and Spain. Wheelock and Wilson (2004) report 
that acquirers tended to have a recent history of rapid growth.  Among the more recent 
studies, Hannan and Piloff (2009) and Koehler (2009) do not include asset growth in their 
regressions, while Hernando et al (2009) find its effect insignificant on acquisitions. 
 
Loan activity  
The importance of loans for EU banks becomes apparent when reviewing data from the 
European Central Bank (2004) on the stability of the EU banking sector, which indicates 
that the share of customers’ loans in total assets was 50.57% in 2003. Therefore loan 
activity may be another factor influencing the decision to acquire a bank. Hannan and 
Rhoades (1987) argue that, on the one hand, a high level of loans would seem to indicate 
aggressive behaviour by the target bank and a strong market penetration with important 
established customer relationships that would make it an attractive target; whereas, on the 
other hand, a low level of loan activity may indicate a bank with conservative or 
complacent management, which an aggressive acquiring bank could turn around to 
increase returns.  
Hannan and Rhoades (1987) find a negative effect of loan activity on acquisition 
likelihood (although not significant). Moore (1996) also finds a negative (and significant) 
effect in both in-market and out-of-market acquisitions. The results of Wheelock and 
Wilson (2000, 2004) are generally mixed depending on the measure of asset quality used. 
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Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) also find this effect to be negatively related to the 
probability of acquisition, although not statistically significant in all cases, while 
Pasiouras and Gaganis (2009) report mixed results across the five large EU countries.  
Finally, none of the recent studies include a measure of loan activity, although Hannan 
and Piloff (2009) consider two measures of the composition of the target’s clientele, 
proxied by the extent to which their loans (and deposits) are local in nature, and find the 
effect of the loans ratio to be positive and significant only in the case of large acquirers, 
while that of deposits positive and significant in all but one specification. 
 
Liquidity  
The liquidity position of a bank is another factor that may influence its attractiveness as 
an acquisition target. However, it is difficult to determine a priori what the effect of 
liquidity and the direction of its influence will be. Without the necessary liquidity and 
funding to meet obligations, a bank may fail unless external support is given (Golin, 
2001). Hence, banks might be acquired because they have moved into liquidity 
difficulties, indicating that low liquidity increases acquisition likelihood. On the other 
hand, excess liquidity may signal a lack of investment opportunities or a poor allocation 
of assets, making banks attractive targets because of their good liquidity position (i.e. the 
size of liquid assets influences acquisition).  
Among the studies that include this variable, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find 
that low liquidity makes banks less attractive targets, thus providing support to the first 
argument, while Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) report a negative relationship between 
liquidity and acquisition likelihood although not statistically significant. 
 15 
Bank M&As and regulations and supervision  
 
Capital requirements  
In their assessment of the likely impact of Basel II capital requirements on bank M&As, 
Hannan and Pilloff (2004) propose that regulatory capital can affect acquisition activity 
in one of two ways. Under the excess regulatory capital hypothesis, merger activity 
would increase as a result of the excess regulatory capital that would be created by the 
lower capital requirements stemming from the adoption of advanced internal ratings-
based (A-IRB) approach to regulatory capital requirements
9
. Under the relative capital 
advantage hypothesis, as a result of differences in the capital standards applied to A-IRB 
banks and other banking organizations not using the A-IRB approach, A-IRB banks 
would acquire banks not subject to A-IRB standards because acquired banks would be 
worth more to A-IRB banks than to current owners. They use data from US banks to test 
the excess regulatory capital hypothesis but do not find convincing evidence to suggest 
that past changes in excess regulatory capital or past changes in capital standards had 
substantial effects on merger activity. However, Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) find 
evidence to support the excess regulatory capital hypothesis. Following an event study 
methodology, they find that more value is created for targets with high excess capital and 
in M&As involving targets with considerably higher excess-capital ratios than their 
acquirers.  
                                                 
9
 This can occur for two reasons. First, while regulators may prevent banks with no excess regulatory 
capital to engage in M&As as the combined entity might violate minimum capital adequacy standards, 
banks with levels of regulatory capital above the required minimum are less likely to violate minimum 
standards, increasing the probability to acquire other banks. Second, with an increase in excess regulatory 
capital, banks should increase their return on equity either by increasing the amount of earning assets 
against which a given amount of capital is held or by reducing capital held against a given amount of 
earning assets. This could result in an increase of banks valuation, leading to an increase in acquisition 
activity.  
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Capital requirements can also have indirect effects on M&As through their impact 
on the risk-taking behaviour of banks. The main argument in support of capital 
requirements is that capital serves as the last line of defence against the risk of bank’s 
insolvency, as any losses a bank suffers could be potentially written off against capital. 
Even in the case where insolvency becomes unavoidable, capital protects to some degree 
depositors, creditors and investors (Le Bras and Andrews, 2004). However, another 
strand of the literature indicates that capital requirements may increase risk-taking 
behaviour (e.g. Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999; 
Calem and Rob, 1999). Other studies provide mixed results. Kendall (1992) suggests that 
higher capital requirements may cause riskier bank behaviour at some points in time, but 
do not imply a trend towards a riskier banking system. Beatty and Gron (2001) indicate 
that capital regulatory variables have significant effects for low-capital banks but not 
necessarily for other banks.  
 
Restrictions on bank activities 
Barth et al. (2004) outline several theoretical reasons for restricting bank activities as well 
as alternative reasons for allowing banks to participate in a broad range of activities. For 
example, they mention that to the extent that moral hazard encourages riskier behaviour, 
banks will have opportunities to increase risk if allowed to engage in a broader range of 
activities (Boyd et al., 1998). Furthermore, large financial conglomerates may reduce 
competition and efficiency. On the other hand, fewer regulatory restrictions permit the 
utilization of economies of scale and scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000), while they 
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might also increase the franchise value of banks and result in more prudent behaviour. 
Finally, broad activities may enable banks to diversify income streams.  
Hence, higher restrictions on bank activities that will affect banks’ opportunities 
to diversify risks, and limit the potential for economies of scope and scale, might 
influence their investment decision by motivating them to engage in M&As as an 
alternative way to achieve their desired outcomes.    
 
Diversification and liquidity related regulations  
As Liang and Rhoades (1991) mention, a predicted benefit of mergers, particularly 
conglomerate mergers, is that diversification across different markets will reduce a firm’s 
risk. For example, Liang and Rhoades (1988) point out that geographic diversification 
potentially permits banks to reduce their insolvency risk primarily through reduction in 
credit and liquidity risk. However, banks might achieve diversification by following 
alternative strategies such as making loans abroad or investing in various liquid assets. 
Hence, regulations that encourage or restrict banks with respect to liquidity as well as 
asset geographical diversification might also have an impact on M&As.  
 
Deposit insurance  
The literature suggests that the deposit insurance scheme of a country can have an impact 
on the risk behaviour of banks and their investment decisions. For example, Krugman 
(1998) suggests that banks that are over-guaranteed and under-regulated tend to over-
invest. Other studies indicate that deposit insurance schemes may encourage excessive 
risk-taking behaviour (Merton, 1977; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Bhattacharya et al., 
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1998; Hendrickson and Nichols, 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). The deposit 
insurance scheme might also have an effect on the stability of the banking systems as a 
whole (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2004). However, Kane 
(2000), Cull et al. (2005), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Kane (2002), and Laeven (2002) conclude that a sound legal system with proper 
enforcement of rules reduces the adverse effects of deposit insurance on bank risk-taking, 
while Gonzalez (2005) finds that deposit insurance has a positive influence on bank 
charter value, mitigating the risk-shifting incentives it creates. Finally, as noted earlier, 
Buch and Delong (2004b) find that fairly priced deposit insurance in the acquirer’s 
country tends to increase the number of mergers banks participate in.  
 
Disclosure requirements 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) argue that accounting and information disclosure requirements 
may affect M&As because good disclosure is a necessary condition for identifying 
potential targets.  They also argue that accounting standards reveal corporate governance 
as they decrease the scope for expropriation by making corporate accounts more 
transparent.  Their empirical results indicate that the volume of M&A activity is 
significantly larger in countries with better accounting standards, hence providing support 
to their argument.  
Disclosure requirements may also have an impact on the risk-taking behaviour of 
banks, and consequently on their investment behaviour (e.g. M&As). For example, 
Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008), and Agoraki et al. (2010) 
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find evidence that accounting and auditing requirements can improve the soundness of 
banks and decrease their risk-taking.   
 
Disciplinary power of supervisory agency 
Buch and DeLong (2004b) point out that weak supervision could alter banks’ decision 
making by fascinating them to engage in risky activities while ignoring activities that 
make good business sense. Obviously, one way to take advantage of a weak supervision 
system is to acquire a risky bank. Looking at cross-border M&As, Buch and Delong 
(2004a) point out that a tough supervisory system in the target country increases the 
number of bank mergers, while greater toughness of the acquiring country’s authorities 
discourage mergers.  
The disciplinary power of supervisor agencies might also have an indirect impact 
on M&As, through its influence on banks’ performance and development.  While the 
results of Barth et al. (2004) indicate that there is not a strong association between bank 
development and performance and official supervisory power, Fernandez and Gonzalez 
(2005) report that in countries with low accounting and auditing requirements a more 
stringent disciplinary capacity of supervisors over management action appears to be 
useful in risk reduction.  
 
Overall country’s legal environment and openness  
Banks will obviously be affected by the overall environment of the country in which they 
operate, with a number of aspects relating to the environment having an impact on their 
investment decisions. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) and Levine (1998) among 
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others mention the effects of differences in the legal environments on the financial 
system. Rossi and Volpin (2004) show evidence of more M&A activity in countries with 
better investor protection. Furthermore, Francis et al. (2008) find some evidence that the 
abnormal returns of U.S. acquirers involved in cross-border M&As depend on economic 
freedom. Other studies show that the influence of regulations on banking is conditional 
on the political and economic environment. For example, Hovakimian et al. (2003) find 
that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance has adverse effects in environments that 
are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption. Similarly, Barth et al. 
(2004) show that better-developed private property rights and greater political openness 
mitigate the negative association of moral hazard and bank fragility. Finally, Fernandez 
and Gonzalez (2005) also report that banks in a poor legal system with improper 
enforcement of rules carry a higher risk.  
 
Bank M&As and market characteristics  
The neoclassical theory argues that apart from regulations there are several additional 
industry characteristics such as technological changes and capacity utilization that are 
strongly associated with M&As (Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade and 
Stafford, 2004; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). Another influential view in the literature, 
known as the behavioural approach, argues that M&As are being driven by stock market 
conditions (Nelson, 1959; Stein, 1988, 1989, 1996; Baker and Wurgler, 2000; 2004; 
Jenter, 2005). Henceforth, various market related factors could potentially be considered, 
such as liquidity, profitability, growth, concentration, the level of economic development, 
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the size of the financial system and financial deepening.  Some of these influences have 
been included as control variables in past studies. 
 
Market Liquidity  
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show that in order for transactions to occur, buyers who 
intend to employ the assets in their first-best use must be relatively unconstrained. 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) reveal that industry-specific asset liquidity is important in 
determining which assets will be divested. Harford (2005) supports the neoclassical 
explanation that mergers occur in response to industry level economic, regulatory and 
technological shocks that require large-scale reallocation of assets, but suggests that 
shocks are not enough on their own, as capital liquidity is also required.   
 
 
Market Profitability 
The level or change in the profitability of the banking industry may also lead to higher 
acquisition activity as a result of attempts by banks to restructure or take advantage of 
investment opportunities that arise. Christensen and Montgomery (1981) show that firms 
in profitable industries tend to make more related acquisitions, while those from less 
profitable industries tend to be involved in unrelated acquisitions in order to improve 
their profit potential. Harford (2005) documents the existence of abnormally high 
changes in profitability prior to merger waves. However, Buch and Delong (2004a) find 
that the relative profitability of banking systems has little explanatory power for cross-
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border merger activity, while Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) report a negative but 
insignificant effect of market profitability on bank M&As in Greece.  
 
Market Growth  
The growth of the market might also affect acquisition activity in two opposing ways. 
Firms might be attracted to engage in acquisitions within industries that have high growth 
rates, while in contrast low growth may indicate the need for restructuring in the industry, 
hence also leading to increased acquisition activity. Harford (2005) reports abnormally 
high growth measures (e.g. employees, sales) prior to waves, providing support to earlier 
studies claiming that firms are attracted to make acquisitions within industries with high 
growth rates (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Schoenberg and Reeves, 1999). 
However, evidence from the US and Greek banking sectors suggest that market growth is 
not a significant determinant of acquisition likelihood (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987; 
Pasiouras and Zopounidis, 2008).  Kohler (2009) includes population as an indicator of 
market potential but finds its effect mostly insignificant on the probability of being 
acquired, specifically on domestic acquisitions within EU-25.       
 
Concentration  
Partly associated with the influence of regulations is market concentration, as anti-trust 
authorities try to prevent M&As if increases in concentration are expected to result in 
excessive increases in market power. According to Hannan and Piloff (2009), the likely 
impact of market concentration on acquisition likelihood depends on the degree to which 
the acquirer can exploit market power more efficiently than the target. They find the 
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effect of market concentration to be insignificant in most of the cases, while Hannan and 
Rhoades (1987) find the effect negative and significant in explaining the likelihood of in-
market acquisitions. Moore (1996) finds a positive and significant relationship between 
the probability of acquisition and market concentration for out-market acquisitions, but 
not for in-market acquisitions.  Kohler (2009) finds the effect of market concentration 
positive and highly significant for both domestic and cross-border targets.  On the other 
hand, Wheelock and Wilson (2004) and Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) report a 
negative relationship, while the results of Pasiouras and Gaganis (2009) are mixed.  
However, Hernando et al (2009) find that the effect of market concentration negative for 
domestic targets and positive for cross-border targets, although the overall effect in their 
combined sample is insignificant.  They conclude that while domestic takeovers are less 
likely in more concentrated markets, the possibility of high rents and weak anti-trust 
concerns of national authorities with regard to foreign acquirers make is more likely that 
concentration has a positive effect on the probability of being acquired in cross-border 
takeovers.  
 
Economic Development  
The investment decision of banks can also be influenced by the overall economic 
conditions in which they operate. At one hand, banks could be involved in M&As during 
periods of boom to enhance their power and take advantage of the profit opportunities 
that arise. On the other hand, banks could be involved in M&As during periods of 
recession to be restructured and to avoid financial distress. Alternatively, bank may 
expand into regions with lower per-capita income because of higher income potential or 
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economic convergence expected from further integration (Lanine and Vander Vennett, 
2007).  Rossi and Volpin (2004) find the level of per capita GNP to be significant and 
positively related to the volume of M&As, but GDP growth to be negatively related and 
significant in four of their six specifications. Buch and DeLong (2004a) find the effect of 
GDP per capita of the acquirer country significantly positive, while that of the target 
country insignificant. Buch and DeLong (2004b) report that GDP has a positive and 
significant impact on the number of international bank mergers in either target or 
acquirers’ country.  Lenine and Vander Vennet (2007) report an insignificant influence of 
per capita GDP growth (as with other macroeconomic influences) while Kohler (2009) 
finds the effect of target country’s per capita GDP mostly negative and significant on the 
probability of being acquired. 
 
Size of the Banking Industry 
The size of the banking industry might have an impact on banks’ interest margins and 
profits (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999, 2000), their opportunities to achieve 
economies of scale (Buch and DeLong, 2004a) and consequently their M&As decisions. 
Diaz et al. (2004) examine the change in profitability of EU banks that were involved in 
acquisitions and report that the size of the banking sector has a negative and significant 
impact on profitability. Buch and DeLong (2004a) find that the size of the target 
country’s banking systems has a negative impact on the probability of the merger, 
suggesting that banks do not invest in markets that have established a relatively large 
banking sector. Furthermore, De Nicolo (2000) argues that insolvency risk is lower in 
more developed financial markets, because these markets provide more financial 
 25 
instruments that are more liquid than in developing markets. This leads us to the 
hypothesis that banks could use these financial instruments for diversification purposes 
rather than being involved in M&As. On the other hand, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999, 2000) suggest that the lower interest margins in larger banking sectors might be 
related to increased competition. Hence, banks in these sectors might see M&As as a way 
to increase their power and competitiveness.  
 
Financial Deepening  
As previously mentioned, the behavioural approach states that stock market conditions 
might affect M&As because of valuation waves. Central to this hypothesis is the 
argument that bull markets encourage managers of firms with overvalued stock to use 
their stock to acquire undervalued targets. Verter (2002) and Giovanni (2005) among 
others confirm that stock market valuations and the size of the stock market are correlated 
with merger activity. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) argue that “the naïve 
explanation that overvalued bidders wish to use stock is incomplete because targets 
should not be eager to accept stock”. They show that potential market value deviations 
from fundamental values on both sides of the transaction can rationally lead to a 
correlation between stock merger activity and market valuation. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) propose an alternative theory of acquisitions, which in a sense is the opposite of 
Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis, by arguing that managers rationally respond to less than 
rational markets. Specifically they argue that since financial markets are inefficient, so 
some firms are valued incorrectly. Managers, on the other hand, who are completely 
rational, can understand stock market inefficiencies, and therefore take advantage through 
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M&As. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) support the idea that misvaluation drives mergers. 
However, in contrast to these studies, Rossi and Volpin (2004) who examine domestic, 
foreign and hostile deals do not find any evidence to support that stock market return has 
an impact on M&As.   
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Data 
The sample used in this study consists of annual observations on the universe of 
commercial banks operating in the EU-15 with available financial data in Bankscope 
between 1996 and 2002.
10
 This gave us a sample of 1,407 banks with 5,986 observations, 
distinguished according to status (i.e. target, acquirer, non-involved), country and year as 
shown in Table I.
11
 The geographical coverage of banks is as follows: Austria (63), 
Belgium (52), Denmark (70), Finland (9), France (278), Germany (226), Greece (24), 
Ireland (35), Italy (159), Luxembourg (132), Netherlands (51), Portugal (34), Spain 
(106), Sweden (16), and UK (152). 
 
   [Insert Table I Around Here] 
   
                                                 
10
 Only commercial banks were considered to avoid comparison problems among different type of banks 
(e.g. cooperative, savings, etc).  Furthermore, as Demirguc-Kunt et al (2004) point out, since the WB 
regulatory data are for commercial banks, it is more appropriate to focus on commercial banks.   
11
 Targets and acquirers were identified in Bankscope, Bankersalmanac and Zephyr databases.  Considering 
that acquisitions can take time to complete, we assume, as in previous studies (e.g. Hannan and Rhoades, 
1987; Wheelock and Wilson, 2004) that acquisitions completed during year t, reflect their characteristics 
during year t-1. Thus for an acquisition that occurred in 1997 we use observations on variables from 1996, 
and so on. The sample is unbalanced in the sense that a complete panel of data is not available for each 
bank in the sample. Hence, the total number of banks with observed data in each year is lower than 1,407.   
 27 
Many previous studies have followed a matched paired technique (e.g. Powell, 
1997; Ali-Yrkko et al., 2005), where a sample of non-acquired firms is usually drawn by 
matching against the sample of acquired firms on the basis of company size, industry 
sector, and/or year of acquisition. While the advantage of this sampling procedure is that 
it helps to reduce the cost of data collection, a matched sample is limited in permitting 
investigation of the effects of industry sector differences. We have therefore chosen an 
unmatched sample that allows us to appropriately condition for differences in regulatory 
and environmental factors across countries.
12
   
 
Variables  
Table II summarises the set of 21 independent variables we use in the regressions below, 
classified for the purpose of discussion below as bank specific, regulatory and market 
related variables.   
 
[Insert Table II Around Here] 
 
Bank specific variables 
Seven bank specific ratios are chosen to represent the dimensions of capital strength, 
profitability, expenses management, loan activity, liquidity, size and growth. Capital 
strength is measured by the equity to total assets (EQAS) ratio, while profitability is 
measured with return on average equity (ROE). Efficiency in expenses management is 
represented by the cost to income ratio (COST), with higher values indicating less 
                                                 
12
 Studies that use an unmatched sample include Hannan and Rhoades (1987), Lennox (1999), Jayaraman et 
al. (2002), Worthington (2004), Pasiouras and Zopounidis (2008) among others.  
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efficient management. Loan activity is captured through the bank’s net loans to total 
assets ratio (LOANS). Liquidity is measured with the liquid assets to customer & short 
term funding ratio (LIQ), which indicates the percentage of customer and short term 
funding that could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. The higher this ratio the 
more liquid the bank is. Size is measured by the logarithm of total assets (SIZE), while 
the annual change in bank’s total assets is used as a measure of growth (GROWTH).  
 
Regulations and supervisions related variables 
To examine the impact of the regulatory framework we use seven measures obtained 
from the World Bank database (Barth et al., 2001) and the Heritage foundation. Briefly, 
we capture for the extent of capital requirements (CAPRQ) on the basis of seven yes/no 
questions from Barth et al. (2001). Theoretically, CAPRQ takes values between 0 and 7 
with higher values indicating more capital requirements. Restrictions on the activities that 
banks can undertake are represented by ACTRS, depending on whether securities, 
insurance and real estate activities are unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited. We 
use LIQDIV to capture the degree to which banks are encouraged or restricted with 
respect to liquidity as well as asset and geographical diversification. It is determined on 
the basis of three yes/no questions and can theoretically take values between 0 and 3, 
with a higher value indicating greater liquidity and diversification. DEPINS captures the 
type of the deposit insurance regime a country has chosen to adopt, determined on the 
basis of three yes/no questions, with higher values indicating more deposit insurer power.  
DISCRQ measures the accounting and information disclosure requirements in the 
banking sector, and can take values between 0 and 8 on the basis of eight yes/no 
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questions, with higher values indicating more information disclosure requirements. 
OFFDISPR measures the official disciplinary power of the supervisory agency, 
indicating whether the authorities can take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems in the banking industry. OFFDISPR can range between 0 and 14, with higher 
values indicating more power of the authorities. ECFR is the Heritage Foundation 
Economic Index that indicates the extent of economic freedom in each country. ECFR 
can take values from 1 to 5, where a score of 1 signifies an economic environment or set 
of policies that are most conductive to economic freedom, while a score of 5 signifies a 
set of policies that are least conductive to economic freedom.   
 
Market specific variables 
A further set of seven variables is chosen to control for various aspects of the market 
environment. We measure market profitability (MROE) with the average return on equity 
of the commercial banking industry within a country, and market liquidity MLIQ with the 
ratio of average liquid assets to customer & short term funding. C5 is the measure of 
concentration in the banking sector, calculated as the total assets held by the five largest 
commercial banks in the country divided by the total assets of all commercial banks in 
the country. MACGDP is the stock market capitalization to gross domestic product 
(GDP) ratio that measures financial deepening. The size of the banking system is 
captured by CLAIMS, calculated as bank claims on the private sector over GDP.  GDPGR 
is the annual growth of GDP, and serves as a proxy of a country’s overall economic 
development. Finally, we use a dummy variable to capture location effects. As the 
European Central Bank (2000) points out in its report on M&As in the banking sector, the 
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process of industry concentration and consolidation seems to have taken place at faster 
pace and earlier in some of the smaller member states than in the larger ones. To capture 
the importance of such differences we introduce a dummy variable that indicates whether 
banks operate in one of the 5 large EU banking sectors
13
 (5EU=1) or not (5EU=0).   
 
Methodology  
We estimate a weighted multinomial logit model of the form:
14
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where P (Y) is the probability of occurrence of the dependent variable in year t. X is a 
vector of variables representing the influence of bank specific, market specific and 
country specific characteristics in year t-1, and βi are the coefficients to be estimated 
relating to each outcome. The categorical dependent variable takes the value zero if the 
bank is non-involved (reference group), one if the bank is acquired, and two if the bank is 
an acquirer. Hence, coefficients are reported and discussed relative to the group that is 
omitted (reference group). For example, a positive (negative) coefficient indicates that an 
increase in the corresponding explanatory variable is associated with an increase 
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 The 5 largest EU banking sectors are: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK.  
14
 The estimation of a logit model can be problematic when there are a few observations from one outcome 
(i.e. targets and/or acquirers) relative to another (i.e. non-involved banks). The reason is that the 
“information content” of such a sample for model estimation is quite small, leading to relatively imprecise 
parameter estimates (Palepu, 1986). While a matched sample avoids this problem, the appropriate solution 
for an unmatched sample is to weight the data and compensate for differences in the sample. The following 
formula is used: Weighting for Group 0 (Non-involved) = (1/N0) * [(N0 +N1+N2)/3], Weighting for Group 
1 (Acquired) = (1/N1) * [(N0 +N1+N2)/3], Weighting for Group 2 (Acquirers) = (1/N2) * [(N0 +N1+N2)/3]. 
For a more detailed discussion on logistic regression and rare events data, see King and Zeng (2001). 
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(decrease) in acquisition likelihood, whether as target or acquirer relative to non-involved 
banks.  
Our base specification can be stated as follows: 
 
MARKETREGULATIONBANKX '3
'
2
'
10
'  
 
where BANK represents the set of bank specific variables, REGULATION constitutes the 
set of country-specific regulatory and supervision variables, and MARKET makes up the 
remaining set of market related country-specific influences. 
In what follows, we estimate only two versions of the base model: Model 1 which 
allows BANK variables only, and Model 2 which adds the influence of REGULATION 
and MARKET characteristics. By separating the influence of bank-specific factors from 
country-specific regulatory and environmental factors, we are able to assess the impact of 
the latter conditional on the internal, bank specific factors. 
The models are estimated using annual data, as available for all the bank specific 
and market variables, as well as economic freedom (ECFR). However, since the Barth et 
al. (2001) database provides information only for one point in time, the rest of the 
regulatory variables (CAPRQ, ACTRS, LIQDIV, DEPINS, DISCRQ, OFFDISPR) are 
given the same value for each country over the time period of our estimation.
15
 
Furthermore, we also adjusted all bank-specific variables by country to account for 
differences in average characteristics of banks across countries.
16
     
                                                 
15
 By assigning same values we assume, as in previous studies making use of this dataset (e.g. Focarelli and 
Pozzolo, 2005, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002, Buch and DeLong, 2004a,b, Fernandez and 
Gonzalez, 2005), that regulatory influences remain constant over limited periods of time.  Barth et al. 
(2004) point out that such regulations change very little over time and control of these influences in their 
study did not alter their findings. 
16
 This follows the practice in earlier studies that calculated industry-relative ratios to account for industry 
specific differences (Platt and Platt, 1990; Barnes, 1990). In our case, standardizing by country averages 
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IV. RESULTS 
 
We first describe the data characteristics and the base results obtained for the total 
number of observations shown in Table I.  To test for the robustness of our base results, 
we then redo our regressions on sub-samples of data, determined on the basis of size 
(large and small banks), location of operation (whether in the principal banking sectors or 
not), and over three successive two-year time periods (1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02). 
Although the results reported below ignore time and country specific dummies, we 
performed all the regressions with appropriate dummies in order to test for data 
poolability, and these confirmed the applicability of our panel data approach.
17
   
   
Base results 
Table III presents summary descriptive statistics, revealing apparently minor 
mean differences in the variables among the three categories of banks, the exceptions 
being SIZE and GROWTH. However, it is worth noting that despite recent efforts to 
harmonize bank regulations across the EU market, the data do in fact reveal significant 
cross-country differences in bank regulatory and supervisory practices. For example, 
CAPRQ ranges between 2 (Sweden) and 7 (Belgium, Denmark, Spain), and ACTRS takes 
values between 1 (Germany) and 2.333 (Belgium, Greece, Italy). DISCRQ ranges 
                                                                                                                                                 
deflates raw values and expresses all variables in relation to the average in the country. Also because values 
of the ratios were computed over different years, standardizing also controls for the mean shift in the ratios 
from year to year. Variables are adjusted as follows: Bank’s Country-Adjusted value of ratio X in year t = 
Bank’s raw value of ratio X in year t / Average value of ratio X in the commercial banking industry of the 
country where the bank operates in year t. Average values for each one of the 15 commercial banking 
industries were calculated from Bankscope, for each year of our analysis.  
17
 We believe that the use of industry (country) relative data and the inclusion of country specific influences 
in model 2 is sufficient to make the joint effect additional country-specific dummies (other than 5EU) 
insignificant.  The extended set of results is available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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between 4 (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal) and 7 (Italy), 
while OFFDISPR takes values between 3 (Sweden) and 12 (Austria, UK).  Finally, the 
average values of ECFR for each country over the entire period are between 1.60 
(Ireland) and 2.95 (Greece). Table IV reports the correlations among the variables, 
showing values lower than 0.6 (those between 0.5 and 0.6 indicated are in bold) implying 
that they can be included individually for estimation without particular concerns in terms 
of multicollinearity
18
.  
 
[Insert Tables III and IV Around Here] 
 
Table V presents the results of the multinomial logit estimation for the full 
sample. Both models have significant chi-square values, allowing us to reject the hull 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. The McFadden’s R2 increases from 0.11 (Model 
1) to 0.15 (Model 2) with the significance of some market related and regulatory factors 
in the EU banking industry, especially for the acquiring banks.  
 
[Insert Table V Around Here] 
 
Among the bank-specific characteristics, the influence of COST and SIZE is 
significantly positive while that of EQAS is negative on both targets and acquirers. The 
direction of these influences on both models uniformly indicates that both targets and 
acquirers were larger, less well-capitalized and less efficient in expenses management 
                                                 
18
According to Judge et al. (1988), correlations below 0.8 should not be too harmful as far as 
multicollinearity is concerned. 
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relative to non-involved banks.  In addition, looking at the magnitude of these influences, 
it appears that both size and cost efficiency have a greater impact on acquirers than on 
targets. The influence of GROWTH and ROE is also significant, being negative on targets 
and positive on acquirers.  Thus, acquired banks were less profitable with lower growth 
prospects than non-involved banks, while acquirers tended to be more profitable with 
higher growth (in total assets). Note also that coefficients of these bank-specific 
influences alter very little in magnitude with the addition of regulatory and market related 
factors.  In addition, the effect of LIQ is negative and significant on the probability of 
being acquired, indicating that high (low) liquidity made targets less (more) attractive; in 
contrast to the results of Wheelock and Wilson (2000) for the US, who reported that low 
liquidity makes banks less attractive targets. The influence of LOANS is broadly 
insignificant in the full sample.
19
   
Among the effects that proxy for the requirements and policies of regulatory and 
supervisory authorities, only CAPRQ, OFFDISPR and ECFR have a significant impact 
on bank acquisition likelihood for both targets and acquirers. The signs on these 
coefficients suggest that banks operating in countries with higher capital requirements
20
, 
lower disciplining power of the authorities, and authorities that are more conductive to 
economic freedom, are more likely to engage in acquisitions. In contrast, the significance 
of the coefficients on ACTRS, LIQDIV, DEPINS and DISCRQ (for acquirers) suggest that 
regulatory environments which support lower restrictions on banks’ activities, lower 
                                                 
19
LOANS is significant on acquirers in model 2 (only at 10% level), the opposite being the case for LIQ. 
However, the correlation between these two variables is 0.56 (see Table 2), which is highest among the 
bank specific variables.  
20
 The positive influence of CAPRQ does not hold in the sub-samples; in fact, this effect is not significant 
for smaller banks and for banks operating in the  non-principal banking sectors as noted below. 
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liquidity requirements, more accounting and disclosure requirements, and higher deposit 
insurer power tend to increase the likelihood to engage as an acquirer, not as a target. 
 Turning to the effects of market conditions we observe from the significance of 
coefficients on MROE, C5, MLIQ and CLAIMS that (from the point of view of both 
targets and acquirers) market environment supporting higher profitability, lower 
concentration, lower liquidity, and lower industry size tended to increase banks’ 
likelihood to engage in acquisition. Furthermore, the significantly negative coefficient on 
5EU dummy suggests that operation in a principal banking sector reduced the acquisition 
likelihood for both targets and acquirers. In contrast, acquisition activity has not been 
influenced by the proxy for financial deepening, the size of the stock market as measured 
by its capitalisation relative to GDP (MACGDP); whereas GDPGR has a significant 
impact on acquirers, suggesting that lower economic activity raised their probability to 
acquire other banks as a means to restructure.  
 
Robustness tests 
Large versus small banks  
As Fields et al. (2004) point out, large banks typically have much more complex financial 
profiles and more sources of liquidity than small banks, as well as considerably different 
risk profiles. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) also show that large bank holding companies 
are allowed to operate with lower capital ratios and typically engage in more risky 
activities. Hence, it is not surprising that size is frequently mentioned among the reasons 
for acquisitions related to both shareholder wealth maximization (e.g. economics of scale, 
economies of scope) and managerial motives (e.g. empire building), which also suggests 
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that other determinants of acquisitions may vary according to the size of the banking 
institutions. The European Central Bank (2000) also points out that with regard to the 
rationale for M&As there is a need to differentiate according to the size of the institutions 
involved and reports that small bank M&As are mostly being carried out for cost 
efficiency reasons and to achieve a size that allows survival. Larger bank M&As often 
have an element of strategic re-positioning and, like small bank M&As, are driven by 
scale economies. Furthermore, M&As between small institutions outnumbers those of 
large institutions by far.  
In view of these considerations, we sought to re-estimate the models on samples 
distinguished between large and small banks. Banks were classified accordingly by 
comparing their total assets with the average total assets of the banking industry in which 
they operate, in the corresponding year. Thus we constructed two sub-samples, one with 
32 targets, 33 acquirers and 744 yearly observations of non-involved large banks, and 
another with 166 targets, 57 acquirers and 5,242 yearly observations of non-involved 
small banks
21
. This reveals, as one would expect, that our full sample contained a much 
larger proportion of smaller banks
22
.  The results for the sub-samples are shown in Table 
VI. 
 
[Insert Table VI Around Here] 
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 A bank is classified as “large” if its total assets are higher than the average total assets of the banking 
industry where it operates, and “small” otherwise. Obviously, such an approach does not consider medium 
sized banks. However, attempting to classify banks into more groups would result in only a few acquired 
and acquiring banks in each group.   
22
 Note that the criterion for splitting the sample on the basis of small-large banks is relative to the country 
in which the bank operates, and so this does not preclude investigation of the overall effect of bank size 
(total assets) on the probability of acquisition. 
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All the regressions have significant chi-squares values with McFadden’s R2 being 
higher for model 2 given the significant influence of many of the country-specific factors.  
Among the bank specific factors, the positive influence of COST persists through both 
sub-samples, even after controlling for the environment in which banks operate (model 
2), suggesting that cost efficiency has been a critical factor in influencing a bank, large or 
small, to engage in acquisition, as target or acquirer.  In addition, its impact is greater on 
the acquirers among the small banks, resembling the full sample results. The coefficients 
of EQAS and ROE are also significant for the small banks. Moreover, in the large banks 
sample, their influence is significant on targets’ probabilities rather than on acquirers’, 
which may seem plausible as large banks need not be profitable or less well capitalised to 
acquire others.
23
      
Comparing the results of model 1 across the two sub-samples, we observe that, 
apart from EQAS, ROE and COST, the effect of bank SIZE is positive and significant to 
both targets and acquirers in the large banks sample, and to the acquirers in the small 
banks sample where its effect is higher in magnitude. By contrast, GROWTH is 
significant to both targets and acquirers among the smaller banks, but only to the targets 
among the larger banks.  The effect of SIZE remains significant in model 2, confirming 
that irrespective of the environment bank size matters more for the large banks, as target 
or acquirer, and considerably more to the acquirers among the smaller banks, thus 
supporting the results of Wheelock and Wilson (2004) who found that the probability to 
engage in acquisition increased with bank size.  Furthermore, size does not seem to 
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 The influence of ROE is marginally significant in model 2 for the acquirers among the large banks, 
although not for model 1.  While this suggests that large banks may or may not be more profitable to 
acquire less profitable banks, the insignificance of EQAS seems to suggest that large banks need not be less 
well capitalized to acquire others, or the insignificance may be attributed to the relative smallness of the 
sample size.    
 38 
matter to the targets among the small banks.  In contrast, growth matters more to the 
smaller banks, as target or acquirer, and also partly to the targets among the large banks 
(whose negative effect confirms that targets are those with lower growth opportunities).  
However, large banks’ tendency to acquire other banks does not seem to be influenced by 
higher growth opportunities.    
As with the full sample, the influence of LIQ is significant and negative in the 
small banks sample, confirming that higher liquidity makes small banks less inclined to 
engage in acquisition, as targets or acquirers.  This effect does not necessarily hold for 
the large banks though. In contrast to the full sample results, the influence of LOANS is 
now significant to the acquirers, being negative for small banks but positive (with higher 
magnitude) for large banks.  This result suggests that higher loan activity increases the 
tendency for large banks to acquire others, the opposite being the case for small banks, 
and presumably explains its insignificance in the full sample.  
 Among the external factors, only CLAIMS is significant (and negative) for both 
targets and acquirers in both samples, confirming that the size of the banking industry 
influences negatively bank acquisition likelihood for both targets and acquirers, large or 
small. Although 5EU is also significant, it has a perversely positive impact on the large 
banks’ target group, implying that this group’s targets and acquirers react differently 
depending on whether they operate in a non-principal banking sector or not. However, 
ACTRS, DISCRQ and DEPINS continue to be significant to acquirers in both samples, 
confirming that acquirers, large or small, tend to be influenced by lower restrictions on 
banks’ activities, more accounting and disclosure requirements, and higher deposit 
insurer power.  But the negative influence of LIQDIV prevails only for the acquirers 
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among the large banks, albeit with higher magnitude.  Of the remaining factors, there are 
more differences in their impact on targets and acquirers across the two sub-samples 
although greater consistency is observed between the results of the full and small banks 
samples. For example, CAPRQ, OFFDISCPR and MROE effects persist in both small 
and full samples with similar magnitude and signs, while ECFR is only significant for the 
targets.  However, the small-large banks sample split also unravels the apparent 
insignificance of some external effects in the full sample, since they appear with opposite 
signs in the sub-samples. For example, ACTRS, DISCRQ and DEPINS were found 
insignificant to the targets group in the full sample, although in the sub-samples their 
effects are significant but with opposite signs, revealing that these regulatory influences 
appear to affect the targets among the large and small banks differently.  Similarly, 
MACGDP is significant to the acquirers, large or small, although its opposite sign in the 
two sub-samples may be the reason for its insignificance in the full sample.  On the 
contrary, the significance of C5 in the full sample owes much to its significance to the 
large banks, rather than to the small banks.  Likewise, the significance of GDPGR to the 
acquirers in the full sample is due much to its impact on the small banks. 
 In summary, the results for the small and large banks appear to confirm the 
importance of bank specific factors, in particular COST, EQAS, ROE, SIZE and 
GROWTH, in influencing the acquisition probabilities of both targets and acquirers. 
These effects are more or less significant after conditioning upon the external factors, 
which tend to vary in their impact on targets and acquirers, large or small.    
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Large versus small banking sectors 
The significance of the 5EU dummy in the large-small bank samples indicates that the 
motives for acquisitions might differ between the five principal banking sectors and the 
rest of the EU.  Indeed, the Group of Ten (2001) report argues that the nature of 
acquisition activity may differ between countries and the European Central Bank (2000) 
report goes far to suggest that there are specific developments in individual countries or 
regions affecting the motives for acquisition. For example, it argues that the acquisitions 
opportunities are likely to be different in a country were there have already occurred a 
number of acquisitions than in a country where there has been little or no acquisition 
activity in the recent past. Since the development of the banking sectors in the five larger 
EU countries differs to a large extent from that in the smaller countries, we can determine 
whether banks in these sectors have characteristics that indicate different motives for 
acquisitions.  
Table VII presents the estimation results with sub-samples constructed on the 
basis of whether the banks operate in one of the five principal EU banking sectors (5EU) 
or not
24
. The first sub-sample accordingly consists of 129 targets, 49 acquirers and 3,998 
yearly observations of non-involved banks operating in the five large markets (5EU). The 
second sub-sample consists of 69 targets, 41 acquirers and 1,988 yearly observations of 
non-involved banks operating in the rest of the EU-15 (non-5EU).  Accordingly our full 
sample comprised nearly twice as many banks in 5EU compared to non-5EU (see Table 
I).  
[Insert Table VII Around Here] 
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 Note that with this sample split we had to drop the dummy variable 5EU from the regressions to obtain 
estimable results.    
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As before, the significant and positive influence of both COST and SIZE holds in 
both sectors for both targets and acquirers, even after controlling for the regulatory and 
environmental factors.
25
  EQAS and ROE are also robustly significant and with expected 
signs for both groups in 5EU, and particularly for the targets in non-5EU.  GROWTH is 
significantly negative on targets and positive on acquirers, particularly in non-5EU.  The 
influence of LIQ remains negative in both banking sectors (but significant only on 
targets), while that of LOANS is significant in non-5EU but with opposite signs on targets 
and acquirers. 
While controlling for the environment in which banks operate (model 2) does not 
alter the significance of these bank-specific characteristics, there appears to be a great 
deal of variation in the impact of the external factors across the two banking sectors, 
specifically in relation to the earlier results.  For example, the influence of CAPRQ is 
now negative (and significant for 5EU); as opposed to its positive impact found earlier 
(Tables V and VI).  A possible explanation for this might be that capital requirements 
have adversely affected the risk-taking incentives of banks to engage in acquisition, 
partly as a result of other regulatory and supervision restrictions which seem to have 
affected targets and acquirers more differently in 5EU than in the rest of the EU.  Most 
significant in 5EU is the positive impact of economic freedom (ECFR) on acquirers’ 
tendency to engage in acquisitions, and their behaviour is positively associated with the 
degree to which they are influenced with regard to liquidity and diversification guidelines 
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 SIZE appears insignificant to the targets group in model 2, but not when we estimate this model by 
adding a large-small banks dummy, whose effect is also significant for the targets group but its inclusion 
does not result in higher overall explanatory power of the model.  In general, we estimated all the models 
here (as well as the full sample model) with a large-small banks dummy and obtained broadly similar 
results (except for model 1 in non-5EU, where its effect as with model 2 is significant on targets but its 
inclusion, by making the effect of GROWTH insignificant, actually contributes to loss of fit). 
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(as shown by the positive impact of LIQDIV); this tendency is of course partly offset by 
the requirements on capital (CAPRQ).  In contrast, acquirers in non-5EU have been more 
significantly influenced by restrictions on accounting transactions (ACTRS).  Targets and 
acquirers in 5EU also seem to have reacted differently to market specific forces.  In 
general, regulatory influences appear to have been more significant in determining 
acquisition likelihood for banks operating in 5EU, whereas market related influences are 
more prevalent among the non-5EU banks.  Nevertheless, both targets and acquirers have 
been influenced by market concentration (C5) and stock market capitalisation 
(MACGDP) in 5EU, and additionally by industry size (CLAIMS) and market profitability 
(MORE) in non-5EU
26
.     
  
Regression over sub-periods 
Pooling of sample across years in effect assumes that the determinants of acquisitions 
remain stable over time. However, previous studies that examine sub-samples find 
acquisition characteristics to change over different periods (Harris et al., 1982; Powell, 
1997; Ali-Yrkko et al., 2005).  In order to determine whether our estimates are consistent 
over time, we performed re-estimations by splitting the full sample according into three 
sub-periods of acquisition activity (1997-98, 1999-00, 2001-02). This partitioning was 
conveniently chosen to maintain a balanced sample size across the three sub-periods, and 
does not necessarily suggest that economic or industry factors changed significantly over 
the whole period. However, according to Table I, acquisition activity in terms of the ratio 
of involved to non-involved banks was more intense in 1999-00 (0.06), followed by 
                                                 
26
 C5 also has a perversely positive impact on 5EU, in contrast to its negative impact in non-5EU, and this 
may be associated with the perverse effects of  CAPRQ, ACTRS and LIQDIV in this sample. 
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2001-02 (0.05), and 1997-98 (0.03), and therefore it seems appropriate to investigate 
whether there are specific causal factors explaining these differences.  
 
[Insert Table VIII Around Here] 
 
Table VIII presents the results for the three sub-periods.  Once again the influence 
of COST, EQAS, SIZE and GROWTH is significant throughout in the absence of country-
specific factors (model 1), and in most cases remains robust after controlling for the latter 
(the only exceptions being SIZE and GROWTH in 2001-02).  The influence of ROE is 
also significant to acquirers (albeit with negative sign in 1999-00) and targets in at least 
two of the three sub-periods.  The effects of LIQ and LOANS are more significant on 
targets than on acquirers, their negative impact in the last two sub-periods being 
consistent with earlier results.      
Turning to external factors, the specific time period under study seems to play a 
significant role in determining which of these country-specific factors affect targets and 
acquirers.  For example, among the regulatory factors, CAPRQ and ACTRS affect 
acquirers in the first two sub-periods, and targets in the last sub-period, although their 
directional impact is consistent with the full sample results.  Similarly, LIQDIV, DEPINS 
and DISCRQ have varying effects on targets and acquirers.  However, OFFDISCPR 
negatively influences both targets and acquirers in all three sub-periods, and this result 
also prevails in the full sample, suggesting that higher disciplinary power of the 
supervisory authorities has adversely affected bank acquisition likelihood. Finally, ECFR 
stands out as highly significant in 1999-00, and its positive influence was also found in 
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the full sample, implying that economic freedom, along with the official disciplinary 
power of the authorities, have been important factors in determining bank acquisition 
likelihood over this period of more intense acquisition activity.         
From the measures that proxy for the market environment, only CLAIMS and C5 
have significant effects on targets and acquirers for at least two of the three sub-periods, 
although these are not uniformly negative as in the full sample. Nevertheless, their 
overwhelming significance across the other sub-samples suggests that industry 
concentration and size are additional market attributes that have influenced bank 
acquisition likelihood to a degree. The remaining variables have generally mixed affects, 
and their impact is not uniform on targets or acquirers across the sub-periods.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We use financial and industry level data for a sample of over 1400 commercial banks 
drawn from EU-15 countries to identify the major determinants of acquisitions in the EU 
banking industry.  In contrast to recent studies that provide evidence on cross-border 
acquisitions or evidence relating to EU-25 (e.g. Hernando et al., 2009, Lanine and Vander 
Vennett, 2007 and Koehler, 2008), our study concentrates on bank M&As within the EU-
15 where such deals have been largely domestic.  However, we extend previous empirical 
investigations that focused on banks’ financial and market characteristics by 
incorporating the influence of regulatory and supervision framework on acquisition 
likelihood, using a broad range of measures including capital adequacy requirements, the 
level of accounting and information disclosure requirements, the degree of official 
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disciplinary power, an index of economic freedom, and a measure of liquidity 
diversification in the industry.  Some of these industry level characteristics have not been 
investigated in the previous literature on EU banking.   
The main focus of this study has been to evaluate the relative influence of bank 
level financial and industry level regulatory and market characteristics in attempting to 
estimate the probability of bank acquisition, as targets or acquirers relative to non-
acquired banks.  Using a multinomial logit model we sought to identify those 
characteristics that most consistently influenced targets and acquirers in estimations 
involving the full sample as well as sub-samples distinguished by large and small banks, 
principle and non-principle banking sectors, and over sub-periods of the analysis. The 
results indicated that both targets and acquirers were significantly larger in size, less well 
capitalized and less cost efficient, in comparison with non-involved banks. Furthermore, 
targets were less profitable banks with lower growth opportunities, whereas acquirers 
were more profitable with higher growth prospects.  Whereas bank size as a motive of 
acquisition had a significant influence on larger banks, among smaller banks it mattered 
even more to the acquirers but less to the targets.  By contrast, growth affected 
acquisitions mainly among the smaller banks. As for other bank specific influences, 
higher liquidity made smaller banks less likely to engage in acquisitions; whereas higher 
loan activity influenced bank acquisitions mainly in the non-principal banking sectors of 
the EU, with a negative effect on targets and positive on acquirers.      
These findings regarding bank level characteristics affecting the probability of 
acquisition are consistent with the neoclassical, value-maximising motives and their 
effects are significant even after controlling for regulatory and environmental differences 
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across the EU countries.  In particular, the finding that underperforming banks are more 
likely to be acquired by better performing banks is consistent with the commonly 
suggested efficiency hypothesis, and underlies the belief that anticipated post-merger X-
efficiency gains are greater as a result.  Furthermore, M&As among the larger and more 
leveraged banks may have been inspired by economies of scale or scope considerations 
with anticipated benefits in terms of yielding synergies, product diversification or entry 
into new markets.  Alternatively, M&As among the larger banks may have reflected a 
desire to gain market power given that banking groups in many European countries have 
been consolidating their positions within national borders following a process of 
consolidation in the EU single market (Campa and Hernando, 2006).  Our evidence in 
this regard is in line with the academic literature (see, e.g. Hernando et al, 2009). 
With regard to the influence of regulatory factors, we also found that banks 
operating in countries with higher disciplining power of the authorities were less likely to 
engage in M&As. To some extent, this was also the case for banks that needed to satisfy 
higher capital adequacy standards.  These findings are plausible since greater toughness 
of the supervisory system and the requirements for greater safety and soundness of the 
banking industry may prevent full exploitation of potential gains associated with M&As, 
and thereby affect banks’ incentive to engage in M&As.  On the other hand, M&As 
might be the desirable means for banks to restructure or recapitalise themselves in 
situations where the supervisory power is weak or where such authorities lack the power 
to control banks’ risk taking activities. Other regulatory influences, such as lower 
restrictions on accounting transactions, higher deposit insurer power, lower disclosure 
requirements and diversification guidelines mainly influenced the acquirers’ tendency to 
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engage in acquisition.  From a policy perspective, these regulatory mechanisms may also 
be seen as barriers supplementing antitrust policies in cases where authorities may want 
to influence the overall acquisition activity in the banking industry.  Additionally, 
industry level characteristics, such as market profitability, market liquidity, market 
concentration and industry size were also significant, specifically in the less advanced 
economies of the EU.  On the whole, although regulatory barriers were found to be more 
significant in the more advanced EU countries, and market influences more prevalent in 
the less advanced EU countries, the role of the external environment in affecting bank 
consolidation is not clear-cut, and our empirical evidence suggests that the specific 
characteristics of banks have played a more significant role in driving M&As in the 
European banking industry. 
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Table I- Observations in sample by country, status and year of acquisition 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
Austria Targets 0 2 0 0 1 1 4 
  Acquirers 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 
  Non-involved 40 39 46 46 49 45 265 
Belgium Targets 0 3 0 3 0 3 9 
  Acquirers 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
  Non-involved 40 41 31 35 28 30 205 
Denmark Targets 1 0 2 2 3 3 11 
  Acquirers 1 0 0 0 1 4 6 
  Non-involved 57 56 59 57 56 50 335 
Finland Targets 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
  Acquirers 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
  Non-involved 6 6 6 4 5 3 30 
France Targets 4 12 10 10 3 7 46 
  Acquirers 4 3 3 3 1 3 17 
  Non-involved 234 231 214 198 187 178 1,242 
Germany Targets 2 4 4 4 6 1 21 
  Acquirers 2 1 4 3 3 1 14 
  Non-involved 187 182 176 174 161 151 1,031 
Greece Targets 0 0 3 4 0 1 8 
  Acquirers 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
  Non-involved 9 11 11 11 11 14 67 
Ireland Targets 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
  Acquirers 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
  Non-involved 20 22 24 26 29 28 149 
Italy Targets 3 2 5 14 3 9 36 
  Acquirers 1 0 2 3 1 2 9 
  Non-involved 82 94 95 110 94 104 579 
Luxembourg Targets 0 1 1 7 7 2 18 
  Acquirers 1 0 1 5 6 3 16 
  Non-involved 104 99 92 89 86 73 543 
Netherlands Targets 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 
  Acquirers 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 
  Non-involved 44 41 41 37 34 31 228 
Portugal Targets 0 0 0 6 2 0 8 
  Acquirers 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
  Non-involved 26 24 24 20 18 12 124 
Spain Targets 0 3 3 6 1 4 17 
  Acquirers 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 
  Non-involved 83 84 75 74 72 78 466 
Sweden Targets 2 1 1 0 1 0 5 
  Acquirers 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
  Non-involved 6 6 6 7 9 8 42 
UK Targets 1 2 1 3 1 1 9 
  Acquirers 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 
  Non-involved 111 119 120 117 113 100 680 
Total  Targets 13 31 32 61 29 32 198 
  Acquirers 10 13 12 21 17 17 90 
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  Non-involved 1,049 1,055 1,020 1,005 952 905 5,986 
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Table II- List of independent variables 
 
Variable Category Description Source/Database 
EQAS Capital strength Equity / Total assets Bankscope 
ROE Profitability Return on average equity Bankscope 
COST Efficiency in  
managing expenses 
Cost/ Income  Bankscope 
LOANS Loan activity Net Loans / Total assets Bankscope 
LIQ Liquidity Liquid assets / Customer & Short term funding Bankscope 
SIZE Size Total assets Bankscope 
GROWTH Growth Annual change in total assets Bankscope 
CAPRG Capital  
requirements 
This variable takes values between 0 and 7, with higher values indicating grater stringency. It is 
determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following seven 
questions:  (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with market risk, (3) Is subordinated debt allowable 
(required) as part of capital? (4) Is the fraction of revaluation gains that is allowed to count as 
regulatory capital lower than 0.75? (5) Are market value of loan losses not realized in accounting 
books deducted? (6) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? (7) Are unrealized 
foreign exchange losses deducted?    
  
World Bank Database, 
Barth et al. (2001) 
ACTRS Restrictions on banks 
activities 
The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the answers in three questions (1) What 
is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in securities activities (the ability 
of banks to engage in the business of securities, underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects 
of mutual fund industry?) (2)  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank 
participation in insurance activities (the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and 
selling)?  (3) What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in real estate 
activities (the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, and 
management)? The answer to each one of the above questions is quantified on a scale of 1 to 4 
depending on whether the answer is: Unrestricted =1: full range of activities can be conducted 
directly in the bank; Permitted = 2: full range of activities can be conducted, but some or all must 
be conducted in subsidiaries; Restricted = 3: less than full range of activities can be conducted in 
the bank or subsidiaries; and Prohibited = 4: the activity cannot be conducted in either the bank 
or subsidiaries. For the purposes of the present study, we use an overall index by calculating the 
average value over the three categories. Obviously, a higher value indicates greater 
restrictiveness.  
World Bank Database, 
Barth et al. (2001) 
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LIQDIV Liquidity/ 
Diversification index 
This variable captures the degree to which banks are encouraged or restricted with respect to 
liquidity as well as asset and geographical diversification. The index is based on the following 
three questions: (1) Are there explicit, verifiable, and quantifiable guidelines for asset 
diversification? (2) Are banks prohibited from making loans abroad? (3) Is there a minimum 
liquidity requirement? The score is calculated on the basis of yes/no questions, by adding 1 to 
yes for questions (1) and (3) and no for question (2) since this response is associated with greater 
diversification. The variable takes values between 0 and 3, with a higher value indicating greater 
liquidity and diversification.  
World Bank Database, 
Barth et al. (2001) 
DEPINS Deposit insurance 
scheme 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise for each one of the 
following questions: (1) Does deposit insurance authority make the decision to intervene a bank? 
(2) Can deposit insurance agency take legal action against bank directors/officials? (3) Has the 
deposit insurance agency even taken any legal action against bank directors/officials? The 
variable takes values between 0 and 3, with higher values indicating more deposit insurer power.  
World Bank Database, 
Barth et al. (2001) 
DISCRQ Accounting and 
disclosure requirements 
This variable is calculated by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the 
following nine questions: (1) Does income statement contain accrued but unpaid 
interest/principal while loan is non-performing? (2) Are consolidated accounts covering bank and 
an non-bank financial subsidiaries required? (3) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? (4) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to public? (5) Must banks disclose risk 
management procedures to public? (6) Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading 
information? (7) Have penalties been enforced? (8) Do regulations require credit ratings for 
commercial banks? ACCREQ can therefore take values between 0 and 9, with higher values 
indicating more information disclosure requirements. 
World Bank Database, 
Barth et al. (2001) 
OFFDISPR Official disciplinary 
power of the 
supervisory agency 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the 
following fourteen questions: (1) Are there any mechanisms of cease-desist type orders whose 
infraction leads to automatic imposition of civil & penal sanctions on banks directors & 
managers? (2) Can the supervisory agency order directors/management to constitute provisions 
to cover actual/potential losses? (3) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to 
distribute dividends? (4) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute 
bonuses? (5) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute management 
fees? (6) Has any such action taken in last 5 years?  (7) Can the supervisory agency supercede 
bank bank shareholder rights and declare ban insolvent? (8) Does banking law allow supervisory 
agency to suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? (9) Does the law establish 
pre-determined levels of solvency deterioration which forces automatic actions such as 
intervention? (10) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory regime or any 
other governmental agency supercede shareholder rights? (11) Regarding bank restructuring & 
reorganization, can supervisory regime or any other governmental agency remove and replace 
management? (12) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory regime or 
World Bank Database, 
Barth et al. (2001) 
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any other governmental agency remove and replace directors? (13) Regarding bank restructuring 
& reorganization, can supervisory regime or any other governmental agency forbear certain 
prudential regulations? (14) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory 
regime or any other governmental agency insure liabilities beyond any explicit deposit insurance 
scheme? OFFDISPR can range between 0 and 14, with higher values indicating more 
disciplining power of the authorities. 
ECFR Economic freedom The Heritage Foundation Economic Index that can take values from 1 to 5, where a score of 1 
signifies an economic environment or set of policies that are most conducive to economic 
freedom, while a score of 5 signifies a set of policies that are least conducive to economic 
freedom. To measure economic freedom and rate each country, the authors of the Index examine 
50 economic variables that fall into the following 10 main categories: Trade policy, Fiscal 
burden of government, Government intervention in the economy, Monetary policy, Capital flows 
and foreign investment, Banking and finance, Wages and prices, Property rights, Regulation, and 
Informal market activity. 
Heritage Foundation 
MROE Market profitability Average Return on equity for commercial banking sector for each country Bankscope  
MLIQ Market liquidity Average liquid assets to customer & short term funding ratio for commercial banking sector for 
each country 
Bankscope  
C5 Concentration  concentration in the banking sector, calculated as the total assets held by the five largest 
commercial banks in the country divided by the total assets of all commercial banks in the 
country 
Bankscope  
MACGDP Financial Deepening  Stock market capitalization to Gross domestic product Euromonitor 
International  
CLAIMS Size of the banking 
sector 
Bank claims on the private sector to Gross domestic product Euromonitor 
International 
GDPGR Country’s overall 
economic development 
Real gross domestic product growth Euromonitor 
International 
5EU Location Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for banks operating in one of the principal banking (i.e. 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) sectors, and zero otherwise 
Bankscope 
 
 64 
Table III – Descriptive Statistics 
  Acquired 
 
Acquirers 
 
Non-involved 
  Mean Median Stdv Mean Median Stdv Mean Median Stdv 
EQAS 1.859 1.394 1.510 1.686 1.261 1.075 2.388 1.671 2.068 
ROE 0.544 0.654 1.272 1.015 0.867 1.399 0.920 0.706 1.047 
COST 1.116 1.102 0.315 1.097 1.022 0.382 0.976 0.974 0.345 
LOANS 1.005 1.006 0.529 1.004 0.991 0.468 0.970 0.964 0.578 
LIQRQ 1.146 1.019 0.898 1.182 0.952 0.793 1.312 1.054 1.093 
SIZE 0.655 0.087 1.282 2.122 0.404 3.669 0.444 0.079 0.901 
GROWTH -0.985 0.190 5.200 2.201 0.484 6.961 1.193 0.382 4.389 
CAPRQ 5.742 6.000 0.992 5.811 6.000 0.911 5.919 6.000 0.770 
ACTRS 1.692 1.333 0.478 1.533 1.333 0.432 1.525 1.333 0.435 
LIQDIV 2.131 2.000 0.802 2.289 2.000 0.753 2.249 2.000 0.702 
DEPINS 0.702 1.000 0.627 0.600 1.000 0.632 0.682 1.000 0.650 
DISRQ 5.202 5.000 1.007 4.922 5.000 0.915 4.963 5.000 0.931 
OFFDISCPR 6.071 5.000 2.514 6.311 6.000 2.542 6.847 6.000 2.808 
MROE 12.038 12.320 5.592 12.032 12.320 5.742 11.607 12.320 5.131 
MLIQ 27.852 28.490 8.416 29.086 28.765 7.723 28.289 28.990 7.080 
C5 68.053 63.120 16.737 67.261 65.790 19.419 68.141 65.790 17.012 
EFCR 2.253 2.263 0.226 2.176 2.238 0.245 2.190 2.238 0.236 
MACGDP 0.950 0.700 0.922 1.021 0.700 0.959 1.178 0.700 1.226 
CLAIMS 1.322 0.324 3.491 2.301 0.363 5.218 2.378 0.363 6.780 
GDPGR 3.094 2.840 1.915 3.295 2.840 2.307 3.043 2.800 1.971 
5EU* 129    49    3998    
Notes: Variables are defined in Table II. The value shown in the case of 5EU corresponds to the number of 
observations from the principal banking sectors  
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Table IV – Correlation analysis 
 
EQAS ROE COST LOANS LIQ SIZE GROWTH CAPRQ ACTRS LIQDIV DEPINS DISCRQ OFFDISPR ECFR MROE MLIQ C5 MACGDP CLAIMS GDPGR 5EU
EQAS 1.00
ROE -0.13 1.00
COST -0.11 -0.35 1.00
LOANS -0.15 0.10 -0.08 1.00
LIQ 0.19 0.00 0.07 -0.56 1.00
SIZE -0.26 0.10 -0.06 0.05 -0.11 1.00
GROWTH -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.03 1.00
CAPRQ 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 0.06 1.00
ACTRS -0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.11 1.00
LIQDIV 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.17 0.05 0.08 0.52 -0.37 1.00
DEPINS 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.09 -0.16 -0.07 0.04 0.23 0.16 -0.02 1.00
DISCRQ -0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.03 0.11 0.03 -0.05 -0.27 0.54 -0.35 0.00 1.00
OFFPR 0.05 -0.15 -0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.23 -0.08 -0.03 -0.30 -0.13 1.00
ECFR 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.15 -0.19 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.26 -0.11 0.60 0.01 -0.44 1.00
MROE -0.05 -0.27 0.04 -0.10 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.18 -0.03 -0.42 0.12 0.43 -0.39 1.00
MLIQ -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.14 0.06 0.10 0.16 -0.07 0.10 0.09 0.03 -0.23 -0.01 0.28 1.00
C5 0.05 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.06 0.10 -0.24 0.13 -0.51 0.25 0.21 -0.04 -0.39 1.00 -0.48
MACGDP 0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 0.12 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.21 0.01 -0.42 0.36 0.48 -0.57 0.56 0.25 -0.48 1.00
CLAIMS -0.10 -0.04 0.11 -0.07 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.30 -0.30 0.03 -0.13 -0.31 0.27 0.50 -0.59 0.34 1.00
GDPGR -0.09 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.29 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.27 0.50 0.39 -0.28 0.24 0.42 1.00
5EU 0.13 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.10 -0.18 -0.17 0.59 0.36 -0.13 0.39 -0.39 -0.09 -0.16 0.09 -0.38 -0.43 1.00
Note: Variables are defined in Table 2; With bold are correlations above 0.50 (in absolute terms)
 66 
Table V – Multivariate logit results  (Full sample: N = 6,274 )  
 Model 1               Model 2 
 Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers 
Intercept -0.148 
(0.729) 
-1.767*** 
(93.744) 
-1.152 
(1.173) 
-0.361 
(0.126) 
EQAS -0.167*** 
(61.144) 
-0.131*** 
(33.752) 
-0.171*** 
(58.57) 
-0.114*** 
(23.592) 
ROE -0.208*** 
(62.649) 
0.074** 
(6.145) 
-0.200*** 
(35.802) 
0.082*** 
(6.597) 
COST 0.833*** 
(60.424) 
1.527*** 
(192.038) 
0.931*** 
(66.02) 
1.605*** 
(192.766) 
LOANS -0.028 
(0.154) 
0.021 
(0.078) 
-0.014 
(0.034) 
0.140* 
(2.955) 
LIQ -0.218*** 
(27.760) 
-0.080* 
(3.460) 
-0.194*** 
(18.437) 
-0.038 
(0.677) 
SIZE 0.150*** 
(25.202) 
0.404*** 
(215.329) 
0.141*** 
(19.441) 
0.445*** 
(223.217) 
GROWTH -0.099*** 
(155.561) 
0.039*** 
(43.319) 
-0.089*** 
(126.013) 
0.035*** 
(32.119) 
CAPRQ   0.196*** 
(7.042) 
0.279*** 
(14.320) 
ACTRS   -0.118 
(0.142) 
-2.453*** 
(57.897) 
LIQDIV   -0.102 
(1.382) 
-0.354*** 
(14.324) 
DEPINS   -0.038 
(0.046) 
1.290*** 
(50.328) 
DISCRQ   0.132 
(0.811) 
0.718*** 
(25.343) 
OFFDISPR   -0.176*** 
(55.222) 
-0.127*** 
(31.586) 
ECFR   0.920*** 
(9.039) 
0.734** 
(5.718) 
MROE   0.045*** 
(13.664) 
0.072*** 
(31.493) 
MLIQ   -0.027*** 
(11.035) 
-0.031*** 
(13.407) 
C5   -0.012** 
(6.439) 
-0.019*** 
(15.693) 
MACGDP   0.122 
(2.124) 
0.119 
(2.197) 
CLAIMS   -0.099*** 
(62.227) 
-0.110*** 
(107.199) 
GDPGR   0.048 
(2.062) 
-0.147*** 
(22.571) 
5EU   -0.767* 
(3.821) 
-3.372*** 
(72.035) 
χ
2 1491.659*** 2048.904*** 
McFadden R
2
 0.108 0.149 
Notes: Variables are defined in Table II. Model 1 is developed with financial variables; 
Model 2 is developed with financial variables and country-specific characteristics; Wald 
test in parentheses; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 
the 5% level, * Statistically significant at the 10% level    
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Table VI - Multivariate logit results (Large vs Small banks) 
 Small banks (N=5465) Large banks (N=809) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers 
Intercept 0.031 
(0.027) 
-1.978*** 
(104.622) 
-4.281*** 
(11.992) 
-2.557** 
(4.381) 
-1.812*** 
(6.602) 
-5.121*** 
(39.531) 
16.307*** 
(15.443) 
-3.580 
(0.921) 
EQAS -0.183*** 
(62.319) 
-0.049** 
(4.645) 
-0.208*** 
(72.301) 
-0.041* 
(2.958) 
-0.611** 
(5.771) 
-0.075 
(0.121) 
-1.110*** 
(12.718) 
0.027 
(0.015) 
ROE -0.165*** 
(25.677) 
0.093*** 
(9.306) 
-0.168*** 
(23.202) 
0.098*** 
(8.941) 
-0.597*** 
(21.393) 
0.041 
(0.155) 
-0.761*** 
(25.801) 
0.207* 
(2.921) 
COST 0.720*** 
(42.032) 
1.732*** 
(243.395) 
0.856*** 
(48.452) 
2.004*** 
(267.375) 
2.196*** 
(21.910) 
1.989*** 
(16.353) 
1.495** 
(6.499) 
2.036*** 
(13.789) 
LOANS -0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.205*** 
(6.905) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.186** 
(4.943) 
0.457 
(2.366) 
1.131*** 
(11.596) 
1.075*** 
(7.006) 
1.409*** 
(16.321) 
LIQ -0.209*** 
(24.322) 
-0.141*** 
(11.045) 
-0.198*** 
(16.888) 
-0.103** 
(4.755) 
-0.328 
(2.662) 
0.444** 
(5.454) 
-0.668*** 
(6.847) 
0.316 
(1.741) 
SIZE 0.015 
(0.006) 
2.351*** 
(158.74) 
-0.207 
(0.925) 
2.453*** 
(147.998) 
0.275*** 
(22.335) 
0.459*** 
(63.604) 
0.338*** 
(21.863) 
0.567*** 
(62.901) 
GROWTH -0.101*** 
(145.225) 
0.046*** 
(58.583) 
-0.087*** 
(110.451) 
0.046*** 
(53.137) 
-0.091*** 
(10.644) 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
-0.008 
(0.067) 
-0.041 
(2.38) 
CAPRQ   0.312*** 
(14.983) 
0.271*** 
(11.118) 
  0.388 
(1.428) 
0.900*** 
(10.018) 
ACTRS   -0.817** 
(5.245) 
-2.557*** 
(49.585) 
  4.933*** 
(13.218) 
-3.615*** 
(9.92) 
LIQDIV   -0.114 
(1.473) 
0.115 
(1.278) 
  -0.244 
(0.587) 
-1.487*** 
(18.917) 
DEPINS   0.023 
(0.014) 
0.979*** 
(23.595) 
  -2.135*** 
(8.106) 
2.001*** 
(10.787) 
DISCRQ   0.629*** 
(13.000) 
0.797*** 
(20.643) 
  -2.426*** 
(15.247) 
1.002* 
(3.768) 
OFFDISCPR  -0.196*** 
(55.026) 
-0.190*** 
(61.712) 
  -0.038 
(0.209) 
0.015 
(0.030) 
ECFR   0.886*** 
(6.699) 
-0.018 
(0.003) 
  -4.045*** 
(9.939) 
2.110* 
(3.598) 
MROE   0.048*** 
(13.153) 
0.039*** 
(7.406) 
  -0.123** 
(4.427) 
0.228*** 
(26.878) 
MLIQ   0.002 
(0.034) 
-0.003 
(0.082) 
  -0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.090*** 
(10.848) 
C5   0.001 
(0.066) 
0.009 
(2.178) 
  -0.077*** 
(13.952) 
-0.090*** 
(33.567) 
MACGDP   0.034 
(0.131) 
0.323*** 
(12.535) 
  -0.390 
(1.874) 
-0.965*** 
(9.418) 
CLAIMS   -0.099*** 
(51.852) 
-0.160*** 
(110.729) 
  -0.296* 
(3.273) 
-0.063** 
(5.405) 
GDPGR   0.071* 
(3.623) 
-0.114*** 
(9.923) 
  0.030 
(0.059) 
-0.110 
(1.979) 
5EU   -1.136*** 
(6.616) 
-2.914*** 
(42.551) 
  4.774*** 
(7.900) 
-4.042*** 
(8.850) 
χ
2 1126.846*** 1864.287*** 272.369*** 524.696*** 
McFadden R
2
 0.094 0.155 0.153 0.295 
Variables are defined in Table II. Model 1 is developed with financial variables;  Model 2 is developed with financial variables and country-specific characteristics; 
Wald test in parentheses; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** Statistically significant at the 5% level, * Statistically significant at the 10% level    
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Table VII - Multivariate logit results (5EU vs non-5EU markets) 
 5EU (N=4176) Non 5EU (N=2098) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers 
Intercept 
 
-0.600*** 
7.422 
-1.83*** 
63.472 
0.054 
(0.002) 
-12.151*** 
(67.722) 
0.979*** 
10.216 
-2.109*** 
39.027 
1.041 
0.339 
1.616 
0.751 
EQAS 
 
-0.142*** 
34.333 
-0.219*** 
58.737 
-0.133*** 
(27.710) 
-0.245*** 
(62.632) 
-0.240*** 
26.909 
0.026 
0.381 
-0.268*** 
24.997 
0.124*** 
7.464 
ROE 
 
-0.193*** 
29.436 
0.138*** 
18.042 
-0.194*** 
(25.898) 
0.127*** 
(10.911) 
-0.430*** 
30.223 
-0.083 
1.060 
-0.449*** 
27.144 
-0.174** 
3.932 
COST 
 
0.818*** 
34.382 
1.825*** 
159.851 
0.87*** 
(35.801) 
2.027*** 
(168.847) 
0.663*** 
13.748 
1.227*** 
43.234 
0.682*** 
10.366 
1.524*** 
48.925 
LOANS 
 
0.292*** 
11.091 
-0.12 
1.642 
0.159* 
(2.892) 
-0.357*** 
(12.574) 
-0.774*** 
30.629 
0.389*** 
7.063 
-0.568*** 
12.616 
0.624*** 
14.648 
LIQ 
 
-0.162*** 
10.605 
-0.047 
0.842 
-0.21*** 
(13.554) 
-0.205*** 
(11.669) 
-0.258*** 
11.165 
-0.049 
0.366 
-0.242*** 
8.587 
-0.055 
0.398 
SIZE 
 
0.172*** 
22.488 
0.407*** 
144.775 
0.142*** 
(14.846) 
0.461*** 
(179.762) 
0.098* 
3.534 
0.382*** 
68.308 
0.079 
1.545 
0.503*** 
71.963 
GROWTH 
 
-0.109*** 
133.009 
0.011 
2.228 
-0.096*** 
(82.205) 
0.038*** 
(16.152) 
-0.074*** 
23.877 
0.083*** 
51.521 
-0.086*** 
26.201 
0.081*** 
48.581 
CAPRQ 
 
  -0.875** 
(6.247) 
-1.509*** 
(16.476) 
  -0.194 
0.820 
-0.199 
0.770 
ACTRS 
 
  1.17*** 
(7.876) 
0.656 
(2.075) 
  0.541 
1.649 
-1.265*** 
7.076 
LIQDIV 
 
  0.883*** 
(15.348) 
1.129*** 
(19.650) 
  1.041* 
3.122 
0.692 
1.214 
DEPINS 
 
  0.066 
(0.047) 
0.148 
(0.212) 
  -0.770** 
5.638 
0.543* 
3.149 
DISCRQ 
 
  0.056 
(0.387) 
0.358*** 
(14.212) 
  -0.464 
0.950 
0.011 
0.000 
OFFDISCPR 
 
 -0.061 
(0.966) 
-0.138* 
(2.910) 
  -0.351*** 
8.868 
-0.181 
2.102 
ECFR 
 
  -0.501 
(0.771) 
4.546*** 
(53.716) 
  1.911*** 
9.387 
0.056 
0.008 
MROE 
 
  -0.027 
(1.599) 
0.057** 
(6.295) 
  0.044** 
5.047 
0.067*** 
9.664 
MLIQ 
 
  -0.032 
(2.383) 
-0.187*** 
(68.900) 
  -0.021** 
4.527 
0.007 
0.435 
C5 
 
  0.044** 
(5.796) 
0.118*** 
(34.979) 
  -0.018** 
4.670 
-0.024*** 
7.765 
MACGDP 
 
  0.347** 
(4.355) 
0.392** 
(4.759) 
  0.334** 
4.460 
0.508*** 
9.426 
CLAIMS 
 
  -0.538 
(2.171) 
1.651*** 
(16.940) 
  -0.146*** 
69.261 
-0.169*** 
104.491 
GDPGR 
 
  0.051 
(0.513) 
-0.115 
(2.262) 
  -0.043 
0.875 
-0.246*** 
31.909 
χ
2 1178.227*** 1590.438*** 503.962*** 917.769*** 
McFadden R
2
 0.128 0.173 0.109 0.199 
Notes: Variables are defined in Table II. Model 1 is developed with financial variables;  Model 2 is developed with financial 
variables and country-specific characteristics; Wald test in parentheses; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 
Statistically significant at the 5% level, * Statistically significant at the 10% level    
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Table VIII - Multivariate logit results (Sub-samples by time period) 
 
 Period 1997-1998 (N = 2171) Period 1999-2000 (N = 2151) Period 2001-2002 (N = 1952) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers Acquired Acquirers 
Intercept -2.412*** 
(47.906) 
-2.107*** 
(40.106) 
-14.270*** 
(12.494) 
-14.989*** 
(10.831) 
0.370 
(1.454) 
-1.514*** 
(22.742) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
-11.926** 
(5.565) 
0.155 
(0.224) 
-1.256*** 
(12.227) 
-20.827*** 
(22.12) 
24.799*** 
(9.752) 
EQAS -0.247*** 
(41.443) 
-0.179*** 
(21.200) 
-0.269*** 
(40.947) 
-0.064 
(1.942) 
-0.206*** 
(28.219) 
-0.153*** 
(14.369) 
-0.201*** 
(24.151) 
-0.088** 
(3.868) 
-0.088** 
(5.415) 
-0.096** 
(5.193) 
-0.097** 
(5.293) 
-0.097** 
(3.704) 
ROE -0.159*** 
(13.394) 
0.163*** 
(14.453) 
-0.206*** 
(15.688) 
0.310*** 
(29.214 
-0.410*** 
(39.603) 
-0.247*** 
(16.892) 
-0.381*** 
(28.176) 
-0.211*** 
(10.646) 
-0.077 
(1.316) 
0.171** 
(6.168) 
0.030 
(0.162) 
0.389*** 
(18.410) 
COST 1.652*** 
(75.500) 
1.726*** 
(86.529) 
1.728*** 
(55.163) 
2.249*** 
(83.347 
0.586*** 
(10.518) 
1.651*** 
(85.283) 
0.894*** 
(19.047) 
1.976*** 
(85.804) 
1.155*** 
(26.499) 
1.003*** 
(18.091) 
1.247*** 
(24.582) 
1.269*** 
(21.141) 
LOANS 0.984*** 
(45.432) 
0.243** 
(2.901) 
1.142*** 
(40.629) 
0.155 
(0.767) 
-0.126 
(0.893) 
-0.146 
(1.062) 
-0.299** 
(4.026) 
-0.101 
(0.374) 
-0.533*** 
(18.064) 
-0.081 
(0.347) 
-0.560*** 
(16.901) 
-0.170 
(1.190) 
LIQ 0.252*** 
9.1880) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.296*** 
(8.326) 
-0.304*** 
(9.291) 
-0.213*** 
(8.143) 
-0.103 
(1.780) 
-0.247*** 
(8.499) 
-0.377*** 
(15.097) 
-0.526*** 
(51.839) 
-0.143* 
(3.586) 
-0.655*** 
(54.066) 
-0.102 
(1.105) 
SIZE 0.117*** 
(8.612) 
0.293*** 
(66.616) 
0.194*** 
(15.366) 
0.464*** 
(89.147) 
0.222*** 
(14.696) 
0.528*** 
(91.303) 
0.125** 
(4.578) 
0.605*** 
(111.800) 
0.143** 
(6.000) 
0.441*** 
(68.238) 
0.064 
(0.985) 
0.648*** 
(87.853) 
GROWTH -0.324*** 
(79.291) 
-0.154*** 
(21.695) 
-0.463*** 
(81.719) 
-0.271*** 
(35.123) 
-0.087*** 
(59.939) 
0.019* 
(3.406) 
-0.074*** 
(42.320)  
0.072*** 
(28.606) 
-0.118*** 
(67.497) 
0.040*** 
(16.859) 
-0.114*** 
(57.004) 
0.016 
(2.140) 
CAPRQ   -0.237 
(1.049) 
0.428* 
(2.810) 
  0.247 
(1.694) 
2.302*** 
(17.914) 
  1.574*** 
(40.283) 
0.354 
(0.993) 
ACTRS   -0.321 
(0.133) 
-1.726* 
(2.837) 
  1.070 
(2.605) 
-7.573*** 
(40.081) 
  -4.383*** 
(18.370) 
5.278 
(2.383)  
LIQDIV   0.416** 
(4.528) 
0.108 
(0.268) 
  -0.285 
(1.424) 
-6.007*** 
(64.495) 
  -2.059*** 
(41.000) 
-1.484*** 
(17.546) 
DEPINS   -2.005*** 
(12.774) 
-3.449** 
(6.643) 
  0.148 
(0.065) 
-3.392** 
(4.418) 
  -0.174 
(0.073) 
0.936 
(1.538) 
DISCRQ   0.946** 
(5.209) 
1.180** 
(5.928) 
  -0.543* 
(2.906) 
0.263 
(0.296) 
  2.171*** 
(19.734) 
-4.920** 
(6.704) 
OFFDISCPR   -0.113** 
(4.952) 
-0.120** 
(5.701) 
  -0.332*** 
(20.654) 
-1.291*** 
(36.726) 
  -0.094 
(1.882) 
-0.947** 
(5.624) 
ECFR   -0.773 
(0.543) 
0.257 
(0.047) 
  2.195*** 
(7.936) 
10.678*** 
(56.324) 
  7.963 
(32.775) 
0.293 
(0.051) 
MROE   -0.002 -0.233***   0.046 0.481***   -0.063* 0.134*** 
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(0.003) (19.746) (2.030) (51.733) (2.787) (8.361) 
MLIQ   -0.019 
(0.443) 
-0.056* 
(3.456) 
  -0.044** 
(4.506) 
-0.431*** 
(53.603) 
  -0.209*** 
(26.044) 
-0.085 
(2.411) 
C5   0.120*** 
(20.993) 
0.154*** 
(28.299) 
  -0.031*** 
(7.466) 
-0.032 
(1.537) 
  0.038** 
(6.086) 
-0.087*** 
(10.954) 
MACGDP   -0.792*** 
(13.262) 
0.323 
(1.045) 
  0.667*** 
(9.578) 
0.485 
(2.543) 
  -0.247 
(0.527) 
-0.182 
(0.106) 
CLAIMS   0.103** 
(6.226) 
0.163*** 
(9.791) 
  -0.131*** 
(24.173) 
-0.222*** 
(34.225) 
  0.927*** 
(33.861) 
0.553 
(1.832) 
GDPGR   0.541*** 
(16.349) 
-0.092 
(0.453) 
  0.063 
(0.103) 
2.856*** 
(30.909) 
  0.054 
(1.029) 
-0.160*** 
(8.117) 
5EU   4.915*** 
(20.199) 
1.881 
(0.981) 
  -0.768 
(0.447) 
6.373** 
(6.051) 
  -2.770** 
(3.624) 
2.172 
(0.554) 
χ
2 561.520*** 1247.345*** 561.566*** 1114.708*** 584.592*** 1094.135*** 
McFadden R
2
 0.118 0.261 0.119 0.236 0.136 0.255 
Notes: Variables are defined in Table II. Model 1 is developed with financial variables;  Model 2 is developed with financial variables and country-specific characteristics; Wald 
test in parentheses; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** Statistically significant at the 5% level, * Statistically significant at the 10% level 
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